
















We investigate the efficiency and equity implications of fiscal decentralization (FD) 
under  a  redistributive  rule  that  takes  into  account  both  local  tax  collection  efforts  and 
deviation of local incomes from respective targets. We show that, if hard budget constraints 
apply, such an institutional set up leads to higher fiscal discipline, measured by higher tax 
collection effort, than under centralized redistribution. Centralized redistribution, however, 
yields  better  income  distribution  than  FD,  whereas  the  latter  also  improves  income 
distribution unambiguously only when equalization across regions is explicitly targeted. In 
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1.  Introduction   
 
Fiscal decentralization (FD) can be described as an institutional mechanism whereby fiscal 
power and responsibilities are transferred from the central government towards local levels of 
government.  Following  the  seminal  work  of  Oates  (1972),  the literature  on  FD  has  been 
extensive.  This  paper  contributes  to  this  literature  by  developing  a  model  to  explore  the 
relationship between FD and fiscal discipline.  
In many countries, local governments rely to a great extent on central government 
transfers to finance their fiscal activities. The need for transfers arises from both vertical and 
horizontal imbalances, the former of which are common due to greater capacity of central 
governments in revenue collection than local governments,
2 while the latter arise from the 
varying fiscal capacities across different regions of a country. Aside from these imbalances, 
insufficient tax collection effort of local governments, which is a form of moral hazard, may 
also necessitate local governments’ reliance on central government transfers.  
Fiscal institutions have potentially important welfare implications via their effects on 
macroeconomic stability and income equality. As an important fiscal institution, redistributive 
mechanisms  can  increase  welfare  by  reducing  or  eliminating  the  vertical  and  horizontal 
imbalances.  However, moral  hazard  and  common  pool  problem  may  also  be exacerbated 
when  redistribution  mechanisms  are  not  well-designed.  This  study  analyzes  the  fiscal 
disciplinary effect of FD by proposing a redistributive mechanism that takes both efficiency 
and  equity  criteria  into  account.  A  redistributive  mechanism,  however  demanding  its 
information requirements and implementation may be, that takes both of these criteria into 
                                                
2 The capacity of central government is usually better than that of local governments due both to 
greater tax bases available to them and tax collection capabilities, such as the quality of personnel.  
Though many developed countries tend to have lower vertical imbalances due to federal systems 
(although in Canada, Switzerland, US and Germany, for example, central government transfers still 
constitute 50% to 70% of local government budgets), developing countries often have much higher 
vertical  imbalances  (local  governments  in  some  Latin  American  countries  rely  on  the  central 
government for between 70% to 80% of their revenues. In countries like Peru, Portugal and Iran this 
ratio has been more than 90%).   
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account is considered to be the most desirable one.
3 This redistributive rule combined with 
fiscal  decentralization  defines  the  fiscal  institutional  design  whose  fiscal  outcomes  are 
investigated in this paper.  
The main motivation for this study arises from the fact that the literature has not yet 
offered a clear framework to analyze the macroeconomic effects of FD. A growing literature 
on the socio-economic consequences of FD provides mixed evidence on the merits of FD.
4 
Likewise, the recent strand of the empirical literature that investigates the macroeconomic 
implications of FD is far from a consensus.
5 In brief, the evidence on the effects of FD is 
mixed and the effectiveness of FD in attaining the socio-economic objectives seems to depend 
on various structural characteristics and institutional factors. 
Against the background, a couple of recent studies investigate the welfare impact of 
FD in view of specific redistributive schemes. Sanguinetti and Tomassi (2004) compare the 
rule-based  versus  discretionary  fiscal  transfers  using  a  game  theoretic  framework  where 
                                                
3 In a survey of nine developed countries, Ma (1997) reports the characteristics of four classifications 
of fiscal transfer systems observed in practice. These systems focus on either efficiency or equity 
objectives or both. In Australia, Germany, Japan, Korea and United Kingdom, transfers are made on 
the basis of both equalization of fiscal capacities and expenditure needs across regions. The second 
method only considers equalization of fiscal capacities (for example, in Canada), assuming the same 
expenditure need across the regions. The third transfer method only considers equalizing expenditure 
needs, measured by a weighted average of various socio-economic and demographic indicators (for 
example,  in  India,  Italy  and  Spain).  A  final  classification  of  fiscal  transfer  methods  entails  the 
equalization of transfers only on the per capita basis (for example, Turkey and, with regards to certain 
types of transfers also Germany, Canada, England and India). 
4 See, for example, Bardhan and Mookherjee (1998), Panizza (1999), Barrett (2000), Blanchard and 
Shleifer (2000), Dethier (2000), Lin and Liu (2000), Norris et al. (2000), de Mello (2000a and 2000b), 
Tanzi (2000), Treisman (2000), Von Braun and Grote (2000), Eaton (2001), Wasylenko (2001), de 
Mello  and  Barenstein  (2001),  Fisman  and  Gatti  (2002),  Feltenstein  and  Iwata  (2002)  and  Hope, 
(2002). While some of these studies show a positive relationship between FD and governance, others 
argue otherwise. 
5 Davoodi and Zou (1998) report a negative relationship between FD and growth in less developed 
countries, although Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2006) show a mixed evidence on this relationship 
and Thiessen (2003) argues that only moderate FD leads to growth. King and Ma (2001) and Neyapti 
(2004) both show negative relationship between revenue decentralization and inflation. Jin and Zou 
(2002) show that government size is positively related with expenditure decentralization and 
negatively related with revenue decentralization. Neyapti (2006) shows that revenue decentralization 
leads to better income distribution, the better the governance. Kappeler and Välilä (2008) argue that 
FD boosts public investment productivity. Neyapti (2010) shows that FD is significantly associated 
with lower budget deficits in largely populated countries.  
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transfers are considered as insurance against local shocks across regions under asymmetric 
information. Welfare comparisons reveal that discretionary financing is more preferable in the 
event of large local shocks, while rule-based transfers are preferred in case of a high degree of 
FD that increases the degree of common pool problem.
6 Stowhase and Traxler (2005) model 
fiscal competition where costs of tax enforcement are shared across regions where, similar to 
the current paper, tax effort (in their case the rate of auditing local tax collection) becomes 
local government’s strategic tool. Their analysis reveals that the fiscal equalization scheme, 
based on net revenue sharing, helps to internalize fiscal externalities.
7 The authors concede, 
however,  that the feasibility of  the  redistributive mechanism they suggest to  improve the 
efficiency in tax collection is questionable in view of informational asymmetries.  
The current paper approaches to the concept of inefficiency in public good provision 
in terms of the deviation from the revenue collection capacity (target revenue), which can be 
computed as the product of an average tax rate and the tax base. The redistributive mechanism 
suggested in this paper differs from Stowhase and Traxler’s net-revenue sharing in that it also 
considers the income compensation aspect.  
We  investigate  the  fiscal  disciplinary  implications  of  two  alternative  schemes  of 
redistribution. Under fiscal  decentralization, local  governments optimally choose their tax 
collection efforts given a pre-announced redistributive rule that both punishes a less-than-full 
tax-collection effort and compensates for the deviation of local incomes from their target.
8 We 
argue that the degree of tax collection effort implies the degree of efficiency of local fiscal 
activity  in  general.
9  Because  local  governments  benefit  from  their  own  spending  but  not 
                                                
6 Their model is not directly comparable to the current one due to the various differences between the 
two models, including that they do not consider a redistributive rule such as the one employed in the 
current paper and taxes are set by both local and federal governments. 
7 As in the current model, the authors consider a fixed statutory tax rate.   
8 One may consider punishment as a second type of tax that the central government imposes on local 
governments in case of insufficient tax effort. 
9  Even though the local governments are not in charge of income tax collection, they contribute to it 
via reporting the local activity effectively.  
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directly from own tax collection effort, redistribution of a common revenue pool may lead to 
inefficiencies  when  incentive  mechanisms  implied  by  the  redistribution  rule  facing  local 
governments are inadequate. Given a common set of taxes, moral hazard may arise in the 
form of less than full tax collection effort by a local government.
10 
Under the fiscal decentralization scheme, we consider two alternative scenarios that 
are differentiated by the nature of interactions among the local governments. The first of these 
is characterized by many small local governments (denoted by FD). In the second (denoted by 
FD
Nash),  the  number  of  localities  is  relatively  few  and  they  act  strategically,  taking  into 
account  each  others’  optimal  action  since  each  local  government  may  think  the  other’s 
behavior may affect its own.  Under the  alternative scheme,  the  central  government (CG) 
decides on the level of transfers without a pre-announced redistribution rule.
11 
We compare the solutions of the respective problems (FD, FD
Nash and CG) to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the proposed fiscal institutional design. Due to the complexity of the 
expressions  resulting  from  the  model’s  solutions,  we  perform  simulations  to  evaluate  the 
results. The basic model outlined above is rich of potential extensions. Besides the benchmark 
case  of  full  information,  we  analyze  the  sensitivity  of  the  results  under  asymmetric 
information, when the poor and rich regions are hit by positive or negative shocks that local 
governments observe but the central government does not. In addition, we investigate the 
effect  of  incorporating  the  target  of  convergence  (equal  income)  across  localities  in  the 
redistributive  rule.  We  also  investigate  the  income  distribution  implications  of  both  the 
benchmark and the rest of the scenarios. 
                                                
10 Hence, the problem addressed in the current framework is not one of optimal taxation; nonetheless, 
local  governments  choose  the  effective  tax  rate  optimally  by  choosing  their  tax  collection  effort. 
Existing studies that investigate the redistributive role of the government are usually in the optimal tax 
literature that emphasizes the equalization of marginal cost of taxation across different tax sources. 
Boadway,  et  al.  (2001),  for  example,  examine  the  relationship  between  FD  and  equalization  via 
redistribution in that context, with a focus on migration across regions.   
11 The comparison of central and local government decisions is similarly done in both Boadway at al 
(2001) and Stowhase and Traxler (2004).   
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Simulations  reveal  that,  when  local  governments  face  a  hard  budget  constraint, 
decentralization leads to greater efficiency, measured by higher tax collection effort and lower 
size of redistribution, than under centralized decision making. The results remain robust in the 
case of informational asymmetries between the central and local governments about the local 
shocks.
12 When budget deficits are allowed to arise under decentralization, which usually 
happens since hard budget constraints are often not effectively imposed on localities, the 
results are reversed however.
13 Redistribution under the central decision making dominates 
the decentralized decision making with regards to income distribution. When convergence 
across  localities  is  targeted  in  the  redistributive  rule,  however,  redistribution  under 
decentralized decision making also improves income distribution unambiguously, although 
not as much as under centralized decision making. Interestingly, and consistent with Bouton 
et al. (2008), improvements in income distribution under decentralization is inversely related 
with the size of redistribution.  
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the basic features of the 
model.  Section  3  reports  the  redistributive  outcomes  of  different  fiscal  schemes  in  a 
comparative  way.  Section  4  provides  two  main  extensions  to  the  base-line  scenario  and 
evaluates their results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  The Model 
The current model focuses on the analysis of public sector behavior, taking the decisions of 
private sector as given in a static framework. The economy consists of n local governments, 
                                                
12 In the absence of informational asymmetries, simulations do not allow a ranking between the FD
Nash 
and CG problems with respect to the total effort and the size of redistribution. 
13 Modifying the current model to explicitly incorporate the burden of spending in the FD problem is 
an interesting extension, although it adds further the current complexity of the model and makes the 
solution untractable. We consider that the component of the redistributive rule that punishes the less-
than-full tax-collection effort serves towards the same purpose, however.  
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redistribution among which is made via the central government. The local governments take 
policy variables, such as the tax rate (t) set by the central government, as given exogenously. 
For the sake of simplicity, tax is assumed to be of one type: that on income. The income of 
each region is assumed to be exogenous.
14 Taxes are collected  by the local  governments 
whose efforts in tax collection may vary.
15  Each local government i (i=1….n) thus has an 
effective tax rate that is given by ti = tAi where Ai is the tax collection effort. The portion (1-c) 
of tax revenues is spent by the local government, constituting part of its expenditures (Gi), 
where c is the proportion sent to the common revenue pool. In addition, local governments 
spend what is transferred back to them (TRi) by the central government according to the 
announced rule of redistribution. Local government spending is the only form of government 
spending in a locality. The government spending in region i is therefore given by:  
Gi = (1- c)tiYi + TRi 
where Yi is the local income, which  is commonly  observed.  For simplicity, localities are 
assumed to differ only in their income levels that are known ex-ante. Alternatively, localities 
can be assumed use the same technology while they differ in their ex-ante known levels of 
capital and labor. The level of private spending Ci is given by
16:  
Ci =(1- ti)Yi    
                                                
14 Here, we assume that the levels, not the relative magnitudes of productive factors may vary across 
regions,  indicating  different  output  levels.  A  natural  extension  of  this  model  is  to  introduce 
heterogeneity across regions in terms of output variability across regions and over time, by allowing 
not only the level of factor endowments across regions, but also their relative magnitudes to vary, 
suggesting different product types across regions, such as agricultural and industrial, an issue to be 
further explored in an extension of this paper. 
15  While  income–tax  is  generally  centrally  collected,  unless  perhaps  in  federal  systems,  the  local 
government’s optimization decision regarding the tax collection effort can be justified on a couple of 
grounds: first, by helping monitor the economic activity subject to tax collection, local governments 
can be rewarded via some pre-announced incentive mechanisms, as this model proposes. Second, local 
government’s  effort  to  collect  income  tax  entails  recording  or  eliminating  unrecorded  economic 
activity and tax evasion, which helps improve the collection of other local taxes that are assumed away 
in this model for the purpose of simplicity.    
16 For the economy as a whole, total transfers are equal to common pool of revenues, leading one to 
obtain: ΣYi =Σ(Ci+Gi).  For a given locality, Ci+G  i= Yi +“net transfers”, where “net transfers” are 
given by: (TRi - ctiYi).  
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The total size of the transfers (TR) by the central government is equal to the sum of revenues 
collected in the common pool: TR =cΣtiYi , and other forms of financing do not exist. Given 
these basic features, the local and central government problems are presented in Parts 2.1 and 
2.2, respectively. 
 
2.1     Local Governments’ Problem: The Case of Fiscal Decentralization  
Under  fiscal  decentralization,  two  alternative  scenarios  are  considered:  i)  no  strategic 
interaction among the local governments (LGs) and ii) the Nash solution, where LGs’ act 
strategically  but  non-cooperatively,  denoted  by  FD  and  FD
Nash  respectively.  The  FD
Nash 
scheme is relevant for the case of  a few  or highly polarized  LGs  that leads them to  act 
strategically,  thinking  that  others’  decision  significantly  affect  her  own  welfare.  In  both 
schemes, CG optimally selects the parameters of the redistributive rule for all possible values 
of local tax collection effort (see Appendix 2). Having observed this rule, the LGs optimally 
choose their effort. Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 report the solutions of FD and FD
Nash.  
 
2.1.1  No Strategic Interaction among the LGs (FD): 
The procedure of FD is defined by an optimization problem where each of the many 
local governments (LGs) maximizes the utility obtained from its own jurisdiction, subject to a 
redistribution  rule.  We  assume  that  (aggregate)  budget  deficit  is  not  a  concern  of  non-
strategically  acting  local  governments;  hence,  overall  budget  balance  is  not  taken  as  a 
constraint. In this sense, FD problem is the case of numerous localities each of which receives 
a minimal share of the social cost of their own action, leading to a common pool problem.  
Each LG chooses its level of Ai, where 0<Ai≤1, which stands for the effectiveness in tax  
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collection. For purposes of tractability, we use a Cobb-Douglass type of utility, in a log-linear 
form, defined over both private and public consumption:
17  
 
i A Max     α ln Ci + β ln Gi      ;   where  i = 1…n                (1) 
subject to   TRi = k t Yi (Ai -1) + m (Yi
*- Yi)        (2) 
 
where i denotes each of the n local governmental units (regions) and Ci , Gi , TRi , Yi and Yi
*.  
α and β represent the relative weights of private and government spending in utility. Equation 
(2) is the rule that gives the amount of transfers for locality i. Yi
* is the exogenously given 
target of Yi.
18 The problem indicates that the cost of increasing effort is the loss of private 
sector utility resulting from decreased disposable income. k and m denote the extent to which 
less than full tax collection effort (Ai -1) is punished and income deviation from a target is 
compensated, respectively. Hence, the redistributive rule accounts for both efficiency and 
equity objectives. While this rule is therefore desirable (see Ma, 1997), its implementation can 
be demanding, though not impossible.
19  
The solution of the LG problem can be written in terms of the optimum effort (A
o):
20 
   
o
i A  = 




m Y Y Y c k t
tY c k
α β β α β
α β
− − + − + +
+ − +
                                     (3) 
The amount of total transfers implied by optimal tax effort
o
i A  is given by: 
*
1 1 1
( 1)( ) ( 1 )( ( 1))
(1 )( ) ( )




c m kt c k m k t




α β = = =
− + + − − + −
= = + −
− − + ∑ ∑ ∑    (4) 
                                                
17 The assumed concavity and the increasing form of the utility function are to satisfy the necessary 
condition for the existence of a solution. Sufficiency conditions are also met. 
18 In an extension provided below, Yi
*’s will be taken to be the same across localities. 
19  To measure the level of tax collection effort, regions with similar income levels can be taken into 
account to calculate a benchmark level of tax revenue.  
20 This is similar to the leader-follower type game because the simulations are conducted such that the 
interaction between LGs and the CG is achieved by matching the optimal Ai’s resulting from the LG 
problem with those used as the feed values in the redistributive rule of the CG.  
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2.1.2.   Nash Solution to the LG Problem (FD
Nash): 
In case of a small number of LGs, each  LGacts strategically, viewing that its transfers result 
from a common pool of revenues that is partially determined by the efforts of the rest of the 
LGs. The common pool of revenues is given by: 
TR = ∑i i TR  = c t∑i i iY A ,   for i =1….n.       (5) 
Given the redistributive rule (2), the optimal level of effort by each LGi (where j=1…n, and 
i≠j) thus depends on others’ optimal efforts:  
















j j j j Y Y m A ktY )           (6) 
The optimization problem then yields: 
o
i A  = 
i
j j j i j j
tY
Y Y m ktY Y Y tA c k
) (
) ( ) (
*
α β
α α β α
+
− + − + −
 
Since each LG assumes that the others select their optimal efforts in the same fashion, the 
Nash equilibrium for
o






j j j i i i i j
tY c k
Y Y m ktY Y Y Y m ktY Y c k
) ) ) (( ) ((




α α β β α α α β α
− − +
− + − + + − + − −
    (7) 
  Although the FD process is likely to result in budget deficits, its costs are not fully 
internalized  by  local  governments,  where  the  LGs  decide  on  their  optimal  effort  levels 
regardless of the level of the overall budget. This is the classical case of the common pool 
problem. Given that the current model does not account for the cost of deficit financing, both 
FD
Nash and CG problems assume balanced-budget rule. FD
Nash hence offers a decentralization 
scheme that is appropriate to investigate the effects of the proposed redistributive rule in case 
some form of fiscal rule or specifically a hard budget constraint is implemented.  
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2.2  Central Government’s Problem 
  As an alternative to the FD problem, the central government (CG) is assumed to be a 
benevolent planner who optimally chooses the level of transfers by maximizing the overall 
welfare of the society. In this case, LGs’ efforts are taken as exogenous.
21 The only constraint 
of the problem is the equality between total transfers and the common pool of revenues: 




[α ln Ci + β ln Gi ]          (8) 








AiYi           (9) 
The solution to this problem is:     




 (Ai Yi) - (1-c)t AiYi                          (10) 
which implies that redistribution results in equal local government spending in each locality 
(Gi) that is to the average effective tax revenue. 
 
3.  Implications 
In  order  to  derive  policy  implications  regarding  the  three  fiscal  schemes  outlined 
above, we perform a comparative static analysis. The signs of the partial derivatives that are 
unambiguous are all in the expected directions: in case of CG’s optimization, c, t, Ai and Yi all 
have positive effects on total transfers. Under FD, the effect of the deviation of income from 
target on Ai and TRi are negative and positive, respectively. In addition, in the FD
Nash problem, 
efforts  of  localities  are  positively  correlated.  Due  to  the  complexity  of  the  expressions, 
explicit signs for the rest of the partial derivatives could not be obtained. Using a reasonable 
                                                
21 To compare the optimal TR’s of the CG with those of FD or FD
Nash., we perform the simulations 
using the same level of efforts across the fiscal schemes; likewise, the same set of TRs are used to 
compare the implied effort levels for case of CG with those of FD or FD
Nash. 
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set of model variables and parameters, we perform a simulation analysis to obtain those signs. 
The results of all the comparative-statics are reportered in Appendix 1. The simulations also 
enable us to obtain a ranking of the alternative FD schemes and the CG problem vis a vis the 
optimal tax collection efforts and the sizes of redistributon.
22  
The following are the range of values for the model parameters
23 as well as for the 
exogenously given Yi and 
*
i Y . For tractability, we assume that there are two LGi’s (i=1,2) the 
first of which is poor region and the second is rich. 
 
α = 0.7;     β = 0.3;    c = 0.1;      t Є [0.1 ; 0.5];    Ai Є(0 ; 1]; 
Y1 Є [100 ; 500];     
*
1 Y Є [ (1.01)Y1  ; (1.1)Y1];    
 Y2  Є [1,000 ; 30,000];    
*
2 Y Є [ (1.01)Y2   ; (1.1)Y2]    
 
To ensure that there exists some redistribution for income compensation (i.e. TR>0), 
simulations take into account the constraint that the total of targeted outputs exceeds the total 
of actual outputs.
24 Justifications for α =0.7 and β = 0.3 can be provided based on the relative 
shares  of  state  and  private  sectors,  respectively,  which  the  chosen figures  are  thought  to 
roughly represent. For c, we use 0.1, which is an approximate figure for the case of a large 
developing country.
25 The policy parameters k and m are obtained as optimal solutions to an 
                                                
22 To compare the levels of total effort, total transfers are taken the same, and to compare the size of 
redistribution, the levels of effort are taken to be the same across the CG and FD problems. 
23  For the  choice  of t,  related  statistics and  analytical  studies provide  some  basis:   in  a  study of 
marginal income taxes, Easterly and Rebelo (1992) report that (income weighted) the rate range from 
as  low  as  0.01  (for  example,  Argentina  and  Guatemala)  to  0.37  (Ireland)  in  the  sample  they 
considered.    The  “effective”  tax  rate,  however,  is  lower  due  to  exemptions,  deductions  and  tax 
evasion.  The effective tax rates (on labor and capital) calculated for a list of developed countries 
(Mendoza et al, 1994) ranged between 0.25 and 0.50 during the 1990s.  Mendoza et al (1994) also 
report that the average tax rates are  also similar for the G-7. Wolff (2005) extend the sample of 
Mendoza et al. to EU-25 and report lower effective capital taxes, which average less than 0.2, than 
labor tax, which average between 0.4 to 0.5.  On the other hand, tax to GDP ratios to express the 
“overall tax burden” in the economy (as suggested by Wolff, 2005) and the average ratio is 0.11 for 
the  less  developed  countries  and  0.15  for  the  developed  countries  in  the  past  decade.    However, 
“overall tax burden” is only a very crude measure of average tax rate.  Hence, for LDCs, as well as for 
the world average, one can take t to be:  0.1< t <0.5.  
24 The income levels can be considered to be in per capita Dollar terms. 
25 The county is Turkey, which, for the lack of more knowledge regarding “c”, can be considered as a 
representative case without loss of generality.  
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alternative CG problem reported in Appendix 2, where CG chooses them to maximize the 
overall utility given the general budget constraint.  
LGs optimally select their level of tax effort given that they are informed about the 
redistributive rule set by CG; hence simulations are performed based on such optimal Ai’s that 
match with the feed values used to calculate the optimal set of k and m pairs. As a result, 
optimal Ai pairs and the implied TRi’s are simulated (using Matlab) for the FD and FD
Nash 
procedures.
26 To be able to compare the level of transfers across the three fiscal regimes for 
each optimal k and m pair, we use the same set of optimal Ai pairs to calculate the optimal 
TRi’s for the CG problem. Next, to be able to compare the implied levels of fiscal discipline 
measured by the effort level under the FD and CG procedures, we take the optimal TRi’s 
simulated for the two alternative FD regimes and find the implied sum of Ai’ s under the CG 
regime. 
  Based  on  he  signs  of  the  partial  derivatives  reported  in  Appendix  1,  the 
following observations can be noted. Under FD
Nash, an increase in the tax rate (t) leads to an 
increased competition among the LGs over a greater size of redistribution (to compensate for 
the lower utility derived from private consumption), which has a positive effect on the level of 
tax effort. In this case, the redistribution rule seems to generate incentives compatible with the 
main fiscal policy instrument, t, as the downward portion of the Laffer curve seems to be 
eliminated. Under FD, however, the effect of t the tax effort is indeterminate.   
Increasing the central government’s share in local tax revenues (c) also leads to greater 
tax effort and transfers under FD
Nash because each LG increases its tax effort in expectation of 
a  greater  common  pool.  The  reverse  occurs  under  FD,  however,  where  an  increase  in  c 
implies  lower  tax  effort  and  transfers;  when  LGs  behave  non-strategically,  they  try  to 
                                                
26 The numbers of optimal k and m pairs (reported in Appendix 2) corresponding to the optimal and 
feed Ai’s that are matching, non-negative and ranging between 0 and 1 are 19355 and 5507 for the FD 
and FD
Nash procedures, respectively.   
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compensate  for  the  utility  loss  arising  from  a  decrease  in  Gi,  which  decreases  in  c,  by 
increasing the utility from private consumption that is negatively related with the effort level. 
 
Proposition 1:  Both increasing the tax rate (t) and the extent of centralization of the 




The higher the weight on public consumption in the utility function (β) the lower is the 
tax effort and redistribution under FD
Nash. This is because local governments can afford to 
forego some transfers via increased punishment in return of additional utility received from 
private consumption, which increases as optimal tax effort declines. This result arises since 
each LG acts in consideration of a smaller common pool of revenues given that (∂Ai /∂Aj) 
>0.
27  When LGs do not act strategically, however, this effect is not observed: an increase in β 
leads them to increase their effort in order to generate more spending for themselves, which 
also results in a larger common pool.   
The higher the weight on private spending in the utility function (α), the higher is the 
tax effort under FD
Nash, which negatively affects the after tax income that in turn leads to 
lower private spending. This seemingly counterintuitive result can be explained by the income 
effect of an increase in α exceeding the substitution effect. Income effect arises in the form of 
increasing the effort, because LG can obtain the same utility with a lower private income than 
before.  Meanwhile,  the  increase  in  the  effort  increases  LG’s  utility  through  the  public 
spending channel as transfers increase due to reduced punishment. Substitution effect, on the 
other hand, would lead LG’s effort to decrease so as to increase private consumption in order 
                                                
27 The condition is k>c, which is met in the simulations. While increasing own tax collection effort 
increases the transfers received by a region, increased tax collection effort of the other region leads to 
reduced transfers.  
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to take advantage of its increased weight in utility. This complementarity between the extent 
of privatization of an economy and increased fiscal discipline under FD can be viewed as a 
challenge to Tanzi (2000) who argues FD to be a substitute for privatization. In case of FD 
without strategic behavior, the effects of α on both tax effort and transfers are indeterminate. 
 
Proposition 2:  When local governments act strategically, the proposed redistributive 
mechanism leads to greater fiscal discipline under fiscal decentralization the more 
privatized the economy.   
 
The positive effect of the punishment parameter (k) has the expected positive effect on 
the  level  of  effort  under  both  FD  and  FD
Nash. Transfers  to  the  poor  region  are  similarly 
affected under FD, although the effect of k on transfers is indeterminate under FD
Nash. The 
effect of the income compensation parameter (m) on tax effort is negative under both FD and 
FD
Nash.  Hence,  while  the  punishment  component  of  the  redistributive  mechanism  indeed 
works as a fiscal disciplining device, the income compensation component leads to a moral 
hazard problem. While m also affects the size of transfers negatively under FD
Nash, this effect 
is  positive  under  FD;  the  moral  hazard  under  FD  is  not  sufficient  to  reduce  the  size  of 
redistribution needed for income compensation.  
 
Proposition 3:  The higher is the deviation of income from the target, the greater are 
transfers  extended  for  the  purpose  of  income  compensation;  under  both  FD  and 
FD
Nash, however, this reduces the incentives for tax collection (moral hazard).  
 
  To investigate the fiscal disciplinary effects of the alterative fiscal schemes, we next 
compare the implied level of total tax efforts and size of transfers. Based on a common set of  
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k  and  m  values,  which  also  corresponds  to  the  same  set  of  Ai’s  for  the  FD
Nash  and  CG 
models,
28 simulations yield the following ordering for total levels of effort and redistribution 
for the case of non-positive budget deficits: 










i A )   
∑i
FD




i TR  (= ∑i
CG
i TR ) 
 
These results indicate that FD leads to larger total tax effort and smaller size of redistribution 
than  CG,  and  under  FD
Nash,  in  case  LGs  face  hard  budget  constraints.  The  findings  are 
reversed in case of positive budget deficits under FD. This is a straightforward implication of 
the common pool problem: FD reduces fiscal discipline when externalities are not sufficiently 
internalized; in this case, since FD
Nash problem takes the balanced budget rule (the case of ) as 
a constraint, it yields higher fiscal discipline than FD.   
 
Proposition 4:  FD) leads to greater fiscal discipline than both FD
Nash and CG in terms 
of  higher  tax  collection  effort.  In  case  hard  budget  constraints  are  not  imposed, 
however, both the size of redistribution is greater and tax effort is lower under FD than 
under FD
Nash (and CG).
29   
 
4.  Extensions  
This section investigates two extensions of the above benchmark scenario of full information. 
Section  4.l  reports  the  effects  of  choosing  equal  income  targets  across  localities  in  the 
                                                
28 The equality between FD
Nash and CG arises from the fact that the budget constraint is common in the 
two problems. 
29 The current results are conjectured to remain when the costs of financing deficits are not fully 
internalized by a large number of small local governments.  
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redistributive rule. Section 4.2 reports the effects of local income shocks that the CG observes 
indirectly,  through  the  remitted  revenues.  Section  4.3  reports  the  equity  impact  of 
redistribution under all fiscal scenarios and informational assumptions. 
 
4.1  Equalization of Incomes across Localities 
  Eliminating  horizontal  imbalances  is  one  of  the  main  objectives  of  redistribution. 
Hence, this section focuses the implications of the FD, FD
Nash and CG schemes in case target 
incomes of different localities are chosen to be the same. This extension also addresses the 
question of whether the above results are an artifact of a particular set of income levels.  
To examine this case, we choose the levels of incomes to be closer in range and 
income targets across localities to be the same:  
 
t Є [0.1 ; 0.5];     Y1 Є[100 ; 1000] ;    Y2 Є[2,000 ; 10,000];     
*
i Y Є[(1.01)Y2  ;  (1.1)Y2] 
 
The corresponding set of (positive) k and m values that produce feasible data points (Ai values 
ranging between zero and one) are 39030 for the case of FD. As noted earlier, these set of 
simulations also indicate greater total tax effort (and smaller size of redistribution) under FD 
as compared to the CG problem, when the LGs face a hard budget constraint. As in the former 
case, FD
Nash and CG problems produce the same set outcomes due to the common budget-
balance constraint, implying that the strategic behavior of local governments competing for a 
common pool produces inferior fiscal results (in terms of discipline), as compared to non-
strategic ones, in case the concern for equity is integrated into fiscal policy.  
Comparative statics of the both CG and FD problems based on the above range of 
parameter values differ in a few respects from the formerly reported ones, however. First, the 
formerly observed ambiguous effects of both t and α on both the level of tax effort and the 
size of transfers are now negative. This indicates that when the redistributive rule is adopted  
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along with an equalization target, increasing taxes have a negative effect on fiscal discipline 
under FD, as viewed on the right side of the Laffer curve. Second, k has a negative effect on 
TR in case of FD. These results are in contrast with the findings under FD
Nash, the results for 
which are equal to those of CG, as before, due to the common budget constraint. The rest of 
the comparative statics yields the same signs as before, which reinforces the validity of those 
findings. 
In  a  study  of  German  fiscal  system,  Von  Hagen  and  Hepp  (2000)  suggest  that 
equalization  across  localities  leads  to  adverse  incentives  for  tax  collection.  Our  findings 
indicate that, under the fiscal rule that is proposed in this paper, such adverse incentives may 
arise  only  in  the  case  of  soft  budget  constraints.  Alternatively,  the  negative  effect  of 
privatization  on  fiscal  discipline  under  equalization  support  the  von  Hagen  and  Hepp 
argument.  
 
Proposition  5:  Adoption  of  an  equalization  target  along  with  the  proposed 
redistributive rule renders tax increases and privatization ineffective tools of fiscal 
discipline. 
 
  4.2  Shocks and Asymmetric Information 
So far, the model assumed that there is no uncertainty regarding the realizations of local 
incomes. To make the model more realistic, we consider a case where idiosyncratic shocks 
hitting local economies are observed perfectly by the local governments, but not by the central 
government. This conforms with the basic philosophy of decentralization since, as Sanguinetti 
and Tomassi states, “...the whole debate over the virtues of decentralization would be a non-
issue if asymmetric information was not important, since in that case a centralized system 
would dominate all alternative arrangements.”    
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When CG receives the portion of local taxes: [(ctAiYi)(1+εi)], where εi can be positive 
or negative, it is not able to distinguish whether the increase or decrease in tax collection is 
due to a change in the local tax effort or to a shock to the income level.
30  Considering that 
(1+εi) may originate from either one, CG uses the following redistributive rule: 
TRi = k t Yi i ε + 1 (Ai i ε + 1 -1)+m( ) 1
*
i i i Y Y ε + −     (11) 
 
While each LG observes its own shock, it also conjectures that the CG will apply the above 
redistributive rule. As a result of this asymmetry, despite the fact that both CG and FD
Nash use 
the balanced budget rule, transfers and the implied effort levels differ between these two fiscal 
schemes  also,  which  is  contrary  to  the  former  set  up  where  all  governments  had  full 
information. 
  Simulations  of  the  model  are  carried  out  assuming  that  the  shock  term  follows  a 
normal  distribution.  The  simulations  are  analyzed  separately  for  the  set  of  positive  and 
negative shocks that are of the magnitude of within 50 percent of the income level, that is 
ε1∈(- 0.5 ; 0.5)Y1. The positive or negative shocks may hit either the poor or rich localities, 
under which the results do not differ, although one may consider that shocks to the poor 
locality are more likely to occur since poor regions are more often than not associated with 
the traditional sector that is prone to the climatic changes.
31 
Simulations under asymmetric information enable the comparison of the outcomes of 
FD
Nash and CG problems because. It is observed that both FD and  FD
Nash generate better 
                                                
30 This is unlike the extreme cases of full or no insurance cases handled in Sanguinetti and Tomassi (2004). 
31 For the case of shocks hitting the poor locality, the usable number of observations obtained in case 
of FD and FD
Nash problems are 2215 and 6683 for the case of positive shock and 26733 and 33821 for 
the case of negative shock. Under the scenario of equalization, the respective data points are
  39030, 
27158, 38891 and 4261. 
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outcomes than both CG when LGs face hard budget constraints.
32 These findings can be 
summarized as follows:  
 
∑i LG i A ,   > ∑i CG i A ,   ;  and    ∑i
Nash
LG i A ,   > ∑i CG i A ,   
∑i LG i TR ,  < ∑i CG i TR ,  ;  and    ∑i
Nash
LG i TR ,  <∑i CG i TR ,   
 
These findings are robust across the sign of the shocks and the size of locality; the presence of 
equal income targets also does not affect the result.  
 
4.3  Income Distribution Effects of Transfers under Alternative Fiscal  
Schemes 
 
To evaluate the income distribution effects of the alternative fiscal schemes, we compare the 
pre-transfer income ratios of the localities with those after redistribution takes place. When 
(Y1/Y2)/[(Y1+TR1)/(Y2+TR2)] is less than 1 (given that locality 1 is the lower income locality), 
redistribution is said to improve income distribution. 
  Simulations indicate that CG problem always yields better income distribution than 
the two FD regimes (except under full information where CG and FD
Nash are not distinguished 
from each other). Moreover, it is observed that income distribution may even worsen under 
FD or FD
Nash unless the equalization objective is imposed via equal income target ranges in 
the  redistributive  rule.  Under  the  equalization  scenario,  however,  even  though  income 
distribution improves under all the fiscal scenarios, centralized redistribution leads to greater 
equality than both of the FD regimes. Hence, the proposed redistributive rule works as an 
insurance against local shocks -- by not-worsening income distribution in case of a negative 
                                                
32  The fact that the source of the shocks is not identified by the government makes the optimal choices of the CG 
and FD
Nash different from each other. For the same reason, the budget constraint may not be met in the case of 
FD
Nash.   
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shock, only when the rule is combined with the objective of equalization (or convergence) 
across localities. 
 
Proposition 6: Alternative fiscal institutional schemes differ in the welfare gains they 
yield;  while  CG  delivers  higher  equity  than  FD  (and  FD
Nash),  decentralization  is 
superior with regards to the efficiency criterion under hard budget constraints (HBC). 
In case local governments face no HBC, then decentralization leads to welfare losses 
(both in terms of efficiency and equity). 
 
Bouton et al. (2008) demonstrate theoretically and empirically that income distribution 
under  FD  worsens  in  vertical  imbalances,  or  the  size  of  transfers.  Our  findings  show, 
however, that when the redistributive rule involves the target of convergence among local 
incomes, redistribution under both FD and FD
Nash improves income distribution, though not 
as much as under CG, while CG has a greater size of transfers.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
This  paper  presents  a  model  to  analyze  the  efficiency  and  equity  implications  of  fiscal 
decentralization. Fiscal decentralization is defined as the local governments’ decision on their 
tax collection effort given the redistributive rule announced and implemented by the central 
government. Local governments may or may not act strategically, providing two alternative 
scenarios  of  fiscal  decentralization.  The  transfer  mechanism  entails  both  income 
compensation and punishment of insufficient tax collection effort.   
The main policy implications of the proposed fiscal institutional design are that i. FD  
has  a  fiscal  disciplining  effect  because,  given  hard  budget  constraints,  it  yields  greater 
efficiency (both higher total tax collection effort and lower size of redistribution) than in the  
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case of the CG problem; when it is not, CG is more efficient. ii. The extent of privatization of 
the economy improves the fiscal disciplining role of FD only when local governments act 
strategically (FD
Nash). iii. Redistribution under CG leads to better income distribution than 
both FD and FD
Nash, indicating a trade-off between the objectives of efficiency and equity. 
Furthermore, an increase in the tax rate is observed to increase both the size of transfers and 
the level of tax effort in case of FD
Nash.  
Further modifications of the model will be made by endogenizing the local output to 
targeted transfers and thus to local tax collection effort. Using these targeted transfers in the 
form of local capital accumulation necessitates a major modification that involves a dynamic 
solution.  
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Appendix 1:   Comparative Statics  
 
Comparative statics for the unambiguous results (for  i,j=1,2; 1 is the poor region) 
    FD Problem:        ∂Ai / ∂(
*
i Y - i Y )<0  ; ∂TRi / ∂(
*
i Y - i Y ) >0 




j >0 ,  if k>c   
CG Problem:       ∂TR/∂c>0;      ∂TR/∂n>0;      ∂TR/∂t>0;    ∂TR/∂Ai  >0;  
∂TR/∂ i Y >0     
Simulation of the Ambiguous Comparative Statics Results -- for the LG problem: 
•  Nash Solution: 
∂
o
i A /∂α >0;    β ∂ ∂ / 1
o A  <0;    β ∂ ∂ / 2
o A  =0 ;     ∂ A
0
i /∂k >0    ;   ∂
o
i A /∂m <0;  
∂
o
i A /∂c >0 ;   ∂
o








i Y - i Y )<0;   
∂TRi /∂Ai >0;   ∂TRi /∂Aj <0 ;    ∂TR /∂Ai <0.  
∂TR/∂α>0;  ∂TR/∂β<0;  ∂TR/∂c>0;    ∂TR/∂t>0 ;   ∂TR/∂m<0;    ∂TR/∂k>0 ;     
∂TR/∂(
*
i Y - i Y )>0  .   






i A /∂α = ?;   ∂
o
i A /∂β >0;   ∂
o
i A /∂k >0;   ∂
o
i A /∂m <0; ∂
o
i A /∂c<0 ;   ∂
o
i A /∂t = ?;   
 ∂TR/∂α= ?;  ∂TR/∂β>0;  ∂TR/∂c<0;    ∂TR/∂t =? ;   ∂TR/∂m>0;   ∂TR/∂k>0 ; 
 ∂TRi /∂Ai >0  ;  ∂TR/∂(
*
i Y - i Y )>0  
           The same results are obtained for individual transfers: TRi  
 
The above results are also summarized in Table 1 below (for i=1,2).  
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Table 1:   Comparative Statics of TR, TRi and Ai. 
 
 
α β β β β c  m  k t  A 1 A 2 (Y i*-Y i)
LG PROBLEM:
    Strategic Solution:
A 1 + - + - + + na + -
A 2 + - + - + + + na -
TR 1 + - + - + + + - +
TR 2 + - + - ? + - + +
TR + - + - + + - - +
    Non-Strategic Solution:
A 1 ? + - - + ? na na -
A 2 ? + - - + ? na na -
TR 1 ? + - + + ? + + +
TR 2 ? + - + + ? + + +
TR ? + - + + ? + + +
CG PROBLEM:
TR na na + na na + + + na
TR 1 na na + na na na na na na
TR 2 na na + na na na na na na
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Appendix 2:   Optimal choice of k and m  
                                                       
For  the  LG  problem,  it  is  essential  to  know  how  the  central  government  will 
redistribute  a  common  pool  of  revenues;  i.e.  the  set  of  punishment  and  equalization 
parameters corresponding to each pair (since n=2 of potential effort levels pertaining to the 
localities.  Hence, parameters k and m are determined optimally by the CG as a solution to the 
problem, where CG maximizes the sum of utilities of all localities subject to the condition that 
the  total  pool  of  revenues  is  equal  to  the  total  transfers  that  is  now  expressed  via  the 
redistributive rule: 
         
 
 
Taking the effort of each locality to range between zero and one, the optimization 
problem is solved for k and m.
33  The values of TR simulated for this problem are the same as 




                                                
33 The comparative-statics simulations of the optimal k and m yield the following results. c affects k 
one to one, while its effect on m is always positive; m increases in both c and t.  Both optimal k and m 
decrease with the effort of the locality with relatively smaller income. While the impact of a larger 
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